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FROM HOMER TO HEGEL: IDEAS OF LAW 
AND CULTURE IN THE WEST 
John Witte, Jr. * 
THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADmON. By Donald R. Kelley. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 358. $35 
In a series of impressive publications, Donald Kelley has uncov-
ered a rich tradition of European thinking on law and culture. Scores 
of obscure European writers from the Italian Renaissance to the 
French Restoration have come to light and life in his writings. 1 Their 
ideas on the nature and function of legal and cultural institutions now 
form an integral part of our understanding of Western intellectual 
history. 
In The Human Measure, Kelley provides a much more ambitious 
account of the ideas oflaw and culture in the West-in part, he says, 
to "atone" for the shortcomings of his earlier work.2 In some 280 
pages of text, he traverses 2800 years of Western thinking about law 
and culture. He begins with the mythical speculations of Homer and 
the ancient Greeks and ends with the metaphysical syntheses of Hegel 
and the modem Germans. In intervening chapters, he treats in rapid 
succession the contributions of the Greek philosophers and Roman 
jurists, the Germanic peoples and early Christians, the medieval and 
Renaissance civilians and canonists, and the early modem legal "phi-
losophers" and "historians," pausing periodically to investigate dis-
crete legal developments in classical Rome and early modem England 
and France. 
The book is not entirely new and does not purport to be (p. xiii). It 
• Director of Law and Religion Program, Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University; 
Fellow, Center for Public Justice, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1982, Calvin College; J.D. 1985, 
Harvard Law School. - Ed. I am grateful for helpful discussions of this review with my col· 
leagues Tom Arthur, Hal Berman, Eliza Ellison, and Colleen Murphy. 
1. See particularly D. KELLEY, THE BEGINNING OF IDEOLOGY: CoNSCIOUSNESS AND SO-
CIETY IN THE FRENCH REFORMATION (1981); D. KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HIS· 
TORICAL SCHOLARSHIP: LANGUAGE, LAW, AND HISTORY IN THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE 
(1970) [hereinafter D. KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS]; D. KELLEY, FRAN~OIS HOTMAN: A REVOLU· 
TIONARY'S ORDEAL (1973) [hereinafter D. KELLEY, FRAN~OIS HOTMAN]; D. KELLEY, HIS-
TORIANS AND THE LAW IN POST REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE (1984); D. KELLEY, HISTORY, 
LAW AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PERSPECTIVES (1984) [here-
inafter D. KELLEY, HISTORY]. 
2. P. x. Kelley says that in his earlier work, particularly his Foundations of Modern Histori· 
cal Scholarship, he "neglected some of the larger and more traditional views of human culture 
and .•• tended to undervalue the role of imitation and myth in historical scholarship." Id. 
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duplicates some of the themes and language of Kelley's own earlier 
writings, particularly in its later chapters. It also repeats many of the 
commonplaces of Western legal and cultural historiography. Kelley, 
however, weaves this earlier work into his own sweeping synthesis, 
which goes well beyond any of his earlier efforts. 
The book is not easy to read. It is elegant and eloquent enough 
and filled with pristine passages and witty aphorisms. But the discus-
sion is terse and wide-ranging, at times even cryptic and convoluted. 
It is also peppered throughout with the technical language and lore 
not only of law, but also of anthropology, philology, sociology, theol-
ogy, philosophy, and a host of other disciplines. Kelley demands of 
his reader considerable familiarity with the events and figures of West-
ern history and considerable facility with the methodology and termi-
nology of the cultural sciences. 
The book compares in erudition and sophistication with several 
other classic treatments of the ideas and institutions of the Western 
legal tradition. Some readers will doubtless add it to their narrow 
shelf of indispensable books on the subject already graced by the 
works of Berman, Cairns, Coing, Dooyeweerd, Pound, Tierney, Villey, 
Vinogradoff, Watson, and a few others. 3 Yet, for all his erudition, 
Kelley devotes surprisingly little space in his volume to the evaluation, 
or even the citation, of many of his distinguished peers. He hardly 
mentions, for example, the work of Harold J. Berman, who popular-
ized, if not coined, the phrase "Western legal tradition," which Kelley 
uses in his subtitle and throughout the volume. 4 He makes only ob-
3. Among numerous sources for each author, see particularly H. BERMAN, LA w AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADmoN (1983); H. CAIRNS, 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL (1949); H. CoING, EPOCHEN DER RECHTSGES-
CHICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND (3d ed. 1976); H. COING, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZU RECHTS-
GESCHICHTE, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND ZIVILRECHT (1982) [hereinafter H. COING, G.A.]; H. 
DOOYEWEERD, ENCYCLOPAEDIE DER RECHTSWETENSCHAP (1946) [hereinafter H. 
DOOYEWEERD, ENCYCLOPAEDIE]; R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); B. TIERNEY, RELIGION, 
LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CoNSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650 (1982); M. VILLEY, Clu-
TIQUE DE LA PENSEE JURIDIQUE MODERNE (1976); M. VILLEY, LA FORMATION DE LA PENSEE 
JURIDIQUE MODERNE (4th ed. 1975); M. VILLEY, LE<;:ONS D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU 
DROIT (1957); M. VILLEY, PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1978); P. VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF 
HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1920, 1922); P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EU-
ROPE (3d ed. 1961); A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985); A. WATSON, THE MAKING 
OF THE CIVIL LAW (1981); A. WATSON, THE SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND LEGAL 
AMBIGUITY (1984). Other important accounts include R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, A HIS-
TORY OF MEDIEVAL POLmCAL THEORY IN THE WEST (1903-1936); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL 
THEORY (5th ed. 1967); C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (2d ed. 1963); F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT (2d ed. 1967). 
Kelley makes only passing references to a few of these writings. 
4. See H. BERMAN, supra note 3, a source that Kelley reviewed in 6 HISTORY OF EUROPEAN 
IDEAS 361 (1985). Berman has used the phrase "Western legal tradition" throughout his career. 
See, e.g .. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 111 (1950); 
H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 175 (rev. ed. 1963). Kelley also uses, without attribution, 
the phrase "Papal Revolution," which Berman popularized. See p. 82 (referring to the "Papal 
Revolution, as it has been called"). See H. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 574-78 for the origin and 
use of this phrase. 
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lique references to many of his other peers, whose writings overlap, 
both chronologically and conceptually, with his own. 
In this review, I provide an interpretive overview of the book, and 
then an evaluation of it, both on its own terms and in light of other 
accounts of the Western legal tradition. 
I. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE HUMAN MEASURE 
Neither the contents nor the thesis of The Human Measure admit 
of easy summary. The book is a highly condensed summary of a sub-
ject that could easily occupy several dozen thick volumes. Even a na-
ked recitation of the main points of the book would require a 
restatement of most of its contents. The principal theme of the book is 
intricate and intermittently and incrementally argued throughout. It 
is also interwoven with a variety of subthemes - some clearly related, 
some seemingly more tangential to the main argument. I shall offer an 
interpretation of the principal themes and subthemes in tum, drawing 
on various parts of Kelley's volume and other sources for illustration 
and amplification. 
A. Culture Versus Nature in the Western Legal Tradition 
The principal theme of Kelley's book, as I understand it, concerns 
the character of W estem thought in general and the unique role that 
law has played within it. W estem thought, Kelley asserts, has from 
the beginning been sharply divided between "naturalist" and "cul-
turalist" perspectives (pp. 1, 276). The naturalist perspective is fo-
cused on "the universe at large, its structure, texture, and 
transformations" (p. 1). It offers scientific knowledge, absolute truths, 
universal ideas, and axioms. The culturalist perspective, by contrast, 
is focused on "humanity, its creations, predicaments, and fate" (p. 1). 
It offers "practical" knowledge, rhetoric and discourse, ideas and ide-
als that are inevitably bound by human time and cultural space (pp. xi, 
1-2, 24-25, 276-78). The clash between these two orientations is the 
"great dialectic of Western consciousness, the central topos and an-
tithesis of Western thought" (p. 24). The West has occasionally been 
able to "transcend" and "suspend" the dialectic through religion and 
myth.5 But it has never been able to eradicate it entirely. 
Although rudimentary forms of this dialectic appear already 
among the earliest Sumerian and Greek poets, its first critical formula-
tion came during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in the debate be-
tween "platonists" and "sophists" about the nature of law and 
government. Platonists argued that, at root, the law and government 
of the Greek polis were based on nature (physis}, on universal ideas 
5. See further discussion infra note 24 and accompanying text, concerning Kelley's under-
standing of the role of religion and the church in Western culture. 
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and principles, and could thus be considered absolutely binding. 
Sophists argued that all laws and governments, whether Greek or bar-
barian, were perforce based on human custom and convention (no-
mos), and thus were binding only if cogent and consistent. In the 
writings of Aristotle and later Hellenistic philosophers, this earlier de-
bate about the nature of law and government hardened into a dialectic 
about the character of reality and knowledge per se: the dialectic of 
culture and nature, nomos and physis. 6 
This ancient Greek contest of nomos and physis has brought forth 
numerous offspring in the West. W estem thought has been a series of 
footnotes not so much to Plato's ideas alone, as to Plato's contests 
with his sophist adversaries. Numerous dualisms, such as those be-
tween Roman technicism and Greek mysticism, Renaissance human-
ism and medieval scholasticism, cultural science and natural science, 
rhetoric and philosophy, subject and object, res cogitans and res ex-
tensa, and numerous others are, for Kelley, essentially "modem ver-
sions of the old conte&t" (p. 1 ). Kelley states this thesis categorically 
in his introduction and conclusion and argues it repeatedly throughout 
the volume. 
This grand characterization of W estem thought, although largely 
lost on the current generation of historians, has ample and distin-
guished precedents. Similar arguments were offered at the tum of the 
twentieth century by such writers as Dilthey, Troeltsch, Cassirer, 
Kristeller, and Randall.7 As a student of Kristeller (p. xiii) and editor 
of the Journal of the History of Ideas (which Kristeller, Cassirer, and 
Randall helped to establish), Kelley is deeply steeped in this historiog-
raphy and reflects it adroitly in his writings. 
Kelley moves beyond traditional intellectual historiography, how-
ever, in focusing the dialectic of culture and nature, nomos and physis, 
on the Western legal tradition. Traditionally, intellectual historians 
focused this dialectic on Western philosophers and theologians -
Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Locke and Leibniz. Kel-
ley shifts this focus to Western jurists and judges - Gaius and Ulpian, 
6. Pp. 24-34. See also F. HEINIMANN, NOMOS UND PHYSIS (1945); E. VOEGELIN, THE 
WORLD OF THE POLIS 305-19 (1957); Kees, Nomos, 17 PAULY-WissowA REALENCYCLOPADIE 
833 (1941). 
7. See, e.g., E. CASSIRER, DAS ERKENNTNISPROBLEM IN DER PHILOSOPHIE UND WISSEN-
SCHAFT DER NEUEREN ZEIT (1911); E. CASSIRER, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COSMOS IN REN-
AISSANCE PHILOSOPHY (M. Domandi trans. 1963); E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 
(1946); 1-3, 19 W. DILTHEY, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN (1921); P. KRISTELLER, RENAISSANCE 
THOUGHT: THE CLASSIC, SCHOLASTIC, AND HUMANIST STRAINS (1961); P. KRISTELLER, 
RENAISSANCE THOUGHT II: PAPERS ON HUMANISM AND THE ARTS (1965); J. RANDALL, THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND (1926); E. TROELTSCH, Aufsiitze zur Geistesgeschichte und 
Religionssozio/ogie, in E. TROELTSCH, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN (rev. ed. 1965); E. TROELTSCH, 
DER HISTORISMUS UND SEIN PROBLEME (1922); E. TROELTSCH, Die Soziallehren der 
christ/ichen Kirchen und Gruppen, reprinted in E. TROELTSCH, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN, 
supra. See also a discussion of this theme in E. KAHLER, MAN THE MEASURE: A NEW AP-
PROACH TO HISTORY 119 (1943); W. WALLIS, CULTURE AND PROGRESS (1930). 
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Gratian and Bartolus, Grotius and Savigny - with an eye to viewing 
their contributions to this ancient theme. Kelley makes numerous, 
and sometimes conflicting, points about these contributions, which he 
unfortunately does not summarize or synthesize adequately. His dis-
cussion can perhaps be best organized under the three manners in 
which the Western legal tradition has contributed to the nomos-physis 
dialectic in W estem thought. 
First, Kelley argues, the Western legal tradition has helped to per-
petuate this dialectic through the age-old legal controversy between 
legal positivists and natural law theorists. Legal positivists contend 
that positive laws are essentially rules promulgated by those in power, 
and that these rules require no necessary religious, rational, or moral 
content for their authority or obligatory force. Natural law theorists 
argue, by contrast, that positive laws must reflect the higher principles 
of justice and equity known by reason and conscience in order to be 
authoritative and obligatory. This positivism-naturalism dialectic in 
law, Kelley contends, is simply a species of the broader nomos-physis 
dialectic in W estem thought. s 
The dialectic between legal positivism and legal naturalism can be 
seen, in various guises, throughout the Western legal tradition. Classi-
cal Roman jurists, for example, were tom between abstract principles 
of justice, equity, and right, on the one hand, and specific doctrines of 
actions, persons, and things, on the other (pp. 38-64). Medieval can-
onists and civilians distinguished between laws and authorities 
founded on immutable nature and those founded on mutable custom 
or political fiat (pp. 116-21, 132-40, 150-57). Sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century English jurists debated whether judicial interpretation 
depends on a "natural" reason that transcends positive law or an "ar-
tificial" reason that is rooted in legal experience and expertise.9 Conti-
nental jurists developed both a "rational jurisprudence" that derived 
principles of universal justice through mathematical logic, and a "his-
8. "Naturalism,'' though itself a loaded term, is often used as a synonym for "natural law 
theory,'' and an antonym for "legal positivism." See H. ROMMEN, DIE EWIGE WIEDERKEHR 
DES NATURRECHTS (1950); Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, 
and History, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 779 (1988). For further discussion of the positivism-naturalism 
dialectic in legal history, see generally E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY 
AND METHOD OF THE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); 1 H. DooYEWEERD, ENCYCLOPAEDIE supra note 3, 
at 133-226; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 3; L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HlsrORY (1953); 
H. THIEME, DAS NATURRECHT UND DIE EUROPAEISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE (1947). 
A convenient sampling of positivist and naturalist writings is provided in READINGS IN Juruso-
PRUDENCE (J. Hall ed. 1938). 
9. Pp. 180-83. For further discussion, particularly of the importance of Sir Edward Coke to 
this debate, see Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward 
Coke, in CULTURE AND PoLmCS FROM PURITANISM TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 25 (P. Zagorin 
ed. 1980); Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory of "Artificial Reason" as a Context 
for Modem Basic Legal Theory, 84 LAW Q. REV. 330 (1968); Vinogradoff, Reason and Con-
science in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence, 24 LAW Q. REV. 373 (1908). For the broader philo-
sophical context in which these debates were worked out, see B. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND 
CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 163-93 (1983). 
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torical jurisprudence" that rooted legal ideas and institutions in the 
social representations and attitudes of a people and its rulers (pp. 213-
22, 243-51, 264-65). Through these and numerous other controver-
sies, the W estem legal tradition provided "one of the principal arenas" 
in which the nomos-physis dialectic was played out (p. xi). 
Second, Kelley avers, the W estem legal tradition provided a labo-
ratory to test various ideas and ideals that were designed to resolve the 
dialectic of culture and nature, nomos and physis. The early Greeks 
and Christians offered religious ideas. The Greeks viewed both human 
customs and natural laws as earthly representations of Olympic gods 
such as Themis (order), Dike Gustice), Eunomia (harmony), and many 
others. The Olympic pantheon ensured the order and unity of both 
nature and culture (pp. 14-20). The Christians viewed Christ as the 
ruler of the world who called both culture and nature to His divine 
service (pp. 67-75). The individual and corporate Christian life thus 
transcended and integrated both human conventions and natural incli-
nations. Later W estem thinkers sought the source of legal unity and 
uniformity in secular myths. Philosophers postulated a mythical state 
of nature that antedated and integrated human laws and natural 
rights. Italy appealed to its utopic Roman heritage, England to its 
immemorial custom, France to its Salle law, and Germany to its an-
cient liberties to unify and sanctify their national legal traditions. 10 
Each of these integrative ideas, however, ultimately failed to re-
solve the core dialectic of nomos and physis, according to Kelley. 
Olympic mysticism faded from Greek consciousness. Greek and later 
Roman writers came to view justice, order, and peace not as divine 
gods but as secular legal principles, encapsulated and elaborated by 
human rules (pp. 20-24, 35-38, 56-61). Jurists were left to debate 
which legal principles and rules were natural, which merely conven-
tional.11 Christian spiritualism gave way to Romanized institutional-
ism (pp. 75-88, 148-57). Christ's divine authority was made human, 
first in the Roman emperor, then in the Roman pope. Christian spiri-
tual ideals were reduced to human rules, first those of Roman law, 
then those of canon law. Biblical theology gave way to "juristic" or 
"political" theology, first in Catholic, then in Protestant forms. 12 De-
10. P. 10. See further discussion in E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE, supra note 7, 
ch. 14, at 176; s. HANLEY, THE Lit de Justice OF THE KINGS OF FRANCE: CoNSTITUTIONAL 
IDEOLOGY IN LEGEND, RITuAL, AND DISCOURSE (1983); J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEV-
ENTEENTH CENTuRY (1967); Cassirer, The Technique of Our Modem Political Myths. in E. 
CASSIRER, SYMBOL, MYTH AND CuLTURE 242 (D. Verene ed. 1979). 
11. This discussion among the Roman jurists yielded the classic distinctions among ius 
natura/e, ius gentium, and ius civile, arranged in order of universality. These basic distinctions 
were developed by the canonists and civilians after the twelfth century. See pp. 121-27, 190-96; 
see also R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, supra note 3; E. CASSIRER, NATUR- UND VoLKERRECHT 
IM LICHTE DER GESCHICHTE UND DER SYSTEMATISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE (rev. ed. 1963). 
12. Pp. 81, 150-51. The terms are from E. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A 
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spite its emphasis on transcendent grace and spiritual liberty, Christi-
anity could not escape the dialectic of nomos and physis. It remained 
tom between law and gospel, structure and spirit, 13 adiaphora and 
dogma.14 Likewise, secular philosophical and nationalist myths dissi-
pated under the hot lights of philosophical skepticism and revolution-
ary iconoclasm. State-of-nature motifs were dismissed as logical 
artifices, ancient constitutions as historical constructs.15 The Western 
legal tradition, like all other W estem traditions, has found the nomos-
physis dialectic ineradicable. 
Third, Kelly contends, the W estem legal tradition has played a 
critical role in the development of Western social and cultural 
thought, in the "definition of Nomos." The Western legal tradition 
has been "the headquarters and homeland of Nomos" (p. xii). It has 
set out "the principal questions, terminology, and lines of investigation 
of the study of humanity" (p. xi) that now occupy the sciences of an-
thropology, sociology, and economics (pp. 6-13, 257-65). While phi-
losophers and theologians have debated the condition of the individual 
and the community, jurists and judges have defined it. As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes once put it, all the great problems of theology and 
STUDY IN MEDIEVAL PoLmCAL THEOLOGY (1957) and w. ULLMANN, THE GROWTH OP PA· 
PAL GoVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 359 (1955). For further discussion of the Romaniza-
tion of Christianity, see c. CocHRANE, CHR1STIAN1TY AND CLAsslCAL CULTURE (1940); THE 
CoNFLICT BETWEEN PAGANISM AND CHRI5flANITY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY (E. Monig-
liana ed. 1963); R. MACMULLEN, CHRI5flANIZING THE ROMAN EMPIRE (A.D. 100-400) 
(1984). 
13. On the tension within Christianity between the emphasis on structure (i.e., formal legal 
definitions of order and orthodoxy in the church) and the emphasis on spirit (i.e., charismatic 
expression and spiritual freedom in the church), see, e.g., J. PELIKAN, SPIRIT VERSUS STRUC· 
TURE: LUTHER AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE CHURCH (1968); Adams, Introduction to R. 
SOHM, OUTLINES OF CHURCH HISTORY ix-xv (M. Sinclair trans. 1958). It was precisely this 
issue that divided two of the greatest German church historians of the twentieth century, Adolf 
von Harnack and Rudolph Sohm. Von Harnack regarded legal structures as imperative to the 
survival of the Christian church, and traced their rudiments to the earliest apostolic church. 
Sohm regarded charismatic authority and spiritual freedom essential to the church, and empha· 
sized this theme in the ancient and medieval church. Compare A. HARNACK, THE CoNrnTU· 
TION AND LAW OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST Two CENTURIES (1910) with Sohm, Wesen und 
Ursprupg des Katholizismus 27 ABHANDLUNGBN DER K~NIGLICH SACHSISCHEN GESELL· 
SCHAF!" DER WISSBNSCHAFfEN PHILOLOGISCH-HISTORISCHE Kl.AssE 133 (1912), reprinted in 
R. SOHM, WESEN UND URSPRUNG DES KATHOLIZISMUS (1967); R. SOHM, WELTLICHES UND 
GEISTLICHES RBcHT (1914). 
14. Pp. 70-88, 148-64. On the adiaphorism controversies in Christianity (concerning the 
distinction between central and penumbral beliefs and activities in the church), see B. 
VERKAMP, THE INDIFFERENT MEAN: ADIAPHORISM IN THE ENGLISH REFORMATION TO 1554 
(1977); Stelzenberger, Adiaphora, 1 REALLEXICON FOR ANTIKE UND CHRISTBNTUM 84 (T. 
Klauser ed. 1950); D. Bowen, John Calvin's Ecclesiological Adiaphorism (1985) (unpublished 
dissertation). 
15. See generally E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE, supra note 7; THE SOCIAL AND 
PoLmCAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE AGE OF REACTION AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION (F. Hearnshaw ed. 1949); THE SOCIAL AND PoLmCAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRE· 
SENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (F. Hearnshaw ed. 1950); L. STRAUSS, 
supra note 8. 
May 1991] From Homer to Hegel 1625 
philosophy, and of society and culture, have ultimately come to the 
law for their solution. 
Many of the "permanent features" of Western culture and cultural 
thought, Kelley argues, originated in Greek thought (pp. 10, 33-34). 
The Greeks "discovered" the "individual 'person'" (p. 153). They 
drew the "fundamental distinction between private and public con-
sciousness and behaviour" (p. 33). They identified the basic features 
and forms of social and political order. They tied the world of nomos 
to positive law, custom, and legal memory and experience (pp. 24-34). 
What the Greeks established in their minds, the Romans reified in 
their laws. Roman jurists provided sharp legal distinctions between 
ruler and citizen, public and private, right and duty. They set forth 
enduring canons of legal discourse and rhetoric, legal systematization 
and codification (pp. 38-48). They separated the legal categories of 
persons, actions, and things, and through this "juridical trinity" indel-
ibly shaped Western cultural and legal thought (pp. 48-51). Western 
thought thereafter was permanently focused (1) on the individual, his 
free will, subjective rights, and social obligations; (2) on property and 
the means of acquiring, maintaining, using, and alienating it; and 
(3) on various forms of legal interaction among persons in both the 
public and the private spheres (pp. 8-9, 48-52, 59-61). Through these 
efforts, the Roman jurists "provided the vocabulary - the terminol-
ogy, conceptualizations, formulas, premises ... for much of civilized 
life in Western terms" (p. 64). · 
In the hands of medieval and Renaissance jurists, this Greek and 
Roman cultural vocabulary was both refined and extended. Like their 
Roman predecessors, medieval and Renaissance jurists strove to sys-
tematize (and even codify) the canon law and civil law, using Greek 
dialectical method (pp. 116, 157, 196-202). They also accepted "Ga-
ius's trichotomization of the law" into persons, things, and actions, 
and under those loci developed elaborate doctrines of contract and 
crime, property and inheritance, procedure and evidence, respectively 
(pp. 117-19, 156). The medieval and Renaissance jurists went beyond 
their "Roman tutors," however. They reworked Roman ideas of so-
cial classification and hierarchy and made great advances in the theo-
ries of legal office, corporation, and representation (pp. 151-52). They 
treated both custom and statute as legitimate sources of positive law. 
They reduced customs to writing, classified them by geography and 
language, and distinguished them closely from mere conventions and 
conveniences (pp. 85-108, 140-47, 156). They parsed statutes into let-
ter and spirit and set forth elaborate theories of legal and equitable 
hermeneutics (pp. 132-44, 148, 154-55). They developed detailed 
rules of "conflicts of law" and systematic theories of the forms and 
interrelationships among civil law, common law, canon law, and the 
law of nations (pp. 121-27, 190-96). In all this, the medieval and Ren-
1626 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1618 
aissance jurists provided "a major link between ancient legal science 
and modem social thought" (pp. 113, 128). 
Early modem jurists proved to be more effective conduits of tradi-
tional cultural ideas than contributors of novel ones. To be sure, these 
jurists made strong advances in theories and practices of legislation, 
adjudication, and codification (pp. 209-13). French and English ju-
rists also produced comprehensive new classifications of national cus-
tom, based partly on traditional Roman methods, partly on indigenous 
methods (pp. 165-74, 199-202). But the pretensions of the seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century "philosophical" school led by Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Domat ultimately deprived Western law of much of its 
cultural influence. Proponents of the philosophical school became 
preoccupied with the quest for a "perfect jurisprudence," a "true 
method," and a "pure language" of law (pp. 209-22). They made pre-
tentious claims about the autonomy and the universal applicability of 
their legal science (pp. 222-28). Although this effort produced consid-
erable advances in legal hermeneutics and systematization, it led pri-
marily to sterile formalism and empty encyclopedism (pp. 252-57). 
The German historical school of jurisprudence, led by Hugo and Savi-
gny, strove mightily to overcome this abstract and arid philosophical 
method of law, and to restore both a healthy respect for Roman legal 
lore and a new appreciation for the interactions among law, culture, 
and custom. But these efforts ultimately proved futile even in Ger-
many. Historical jurisprudence was ultimately eclipsed by the rise of 
Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, on the one hand, and the codification 
movements, on the other (pp. 246-57). 
Since the dawn of the twentieth century, Kelley argues in his brief 
final chapter, the W estem legal tradition has experienced an "intellec-
tual fall from grace" (pp. 277-78). For more than two millennia the 
law had served as the principal science of humanity, the chief orga-
nizer and interpreter of Western culture. Now it has fallen prey to 
"conceptual and moral disarray" and become fragmented into numer-
ous competing "sectors" which have "little in common, hardly even a 
professional memory" (p. 278). When legal history is studied, it is 
curiously "detached from the study of the human sciences and even 
from history itself."16 When interdisciplinary approaches to law are 
offered, the product is "technical or ideological rather than historical 
or anthropological" and serves "the legal profession rather than . . . 
human understanding in any broad sense" (p. 278). Various cultural 
sciences like economics, anthropology, and sociology have assumed 
the role that legal science has abdicated. Although these sciences re-
tain many of the terms and concepts first forged in the Western legal 
16. P. 278; see also p. 5 (on the "surveys and a massive monographic literature devoted to 
the 'external history' of the law and aimed at uncovering the 'original' meaning of legal texts 
beneath successive layers of interpretation"). 
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tradition, they no longer look to the law either for instruction or 
inspiration. 
B. A Challenge to Conventions 
The Human Measure is not only an account of the contributions of 
the W estem legal tradition to the dialectic of nature and culture. It is 
also a challenge to the conventions of legal philosophy, cultural sci-
ence, and historiography. 
Kelley challenges contemporary jurists to view custom as a legiti-
mate source of law and historical jurisprudence as a legitimate school 
of legal philosophy. Contemporary jurists, Kelley argues, have taken 
too narrow a view of the sources and types of law. Positivists empha-
size statutes and constitutions. Naturalists emphasize rational and 
moral principles. But custom, says Kelley, is "the most rudimentary 
[and] most fundamental form of law" (p. 1), which gives shape and 
meaning to both statutory rules and moral principles. Inattention to 
this insight has enmeshed contemporary legal philosophy in a network 
of antinomies.17 Likewise, contemporary jurists have taken too dim a 
view of historical jurisprudence. Historical jurists have seen more 
clearly than others the indispensable connections among rules, princi-
ples, and customs and among law, culture, and the state. According 
to Kelley, they deserve a far more prominent place in the Anglo-
American legal academy than they currently occupy.1s 
Kelley also challenges both the lamentations of some cultural 
scientists and the pretensions of others. Against the prophets of cul-
tural decay and doom in the West, Kelley offers a vigorous gospel of 
cultural tradition.19 The solution to our modem W estem crisis lies 
principally in the removal of (what C.S. Lewis once called) our 
"chronological snobbery" and in the "restoration of memory" of the 
cultural wisdom of the W estem past. 20 Against the pretentious claims 
of certain economists, sociologists, and anthropologists that theirs is 
17. For similar contemporary perspectives, see C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 3, at 233; Berman, 
supra note 8; Black, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, CoMMUNITY IN HlsToRICAL PERSPECTIVE xiv-
xxx (A. Black ed. & M. Fischer trans. 1990); see also J. PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADI-
TION (1984) (on the comparable place of custom and tradition in Christianity); E. SHII.S, TRADI-
TION (1981) (on the comparable place of custom and tradition in philosophy). 
18. There has been a considerable resurgence of interest in English and American legal his-
tory in the past two decades, and this has given historical jurisprudence fresh life. See generally 
Berman, Introductory Remarks: Why the History of Western Law Is Not Written, 1984 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 511 (1984); Black, supra note 17; Woodard, History, Legal History and Legal Education. 53 
VA. L. REV. 89 (1967). 
19. Kelley singles out for criticism in this volume, E. HUSSERL, DIE KRISIS DER EUROPAIS-
CHEN WISSENSCHAFfEN UND DIE TRANZENDENTALE PHXNOMENOLOGIE (1954). Kelley shows 
the same impatience with such crisis-mongering in his other writings. See, e.g., Kelley, supra 
note 4, at 361-62 (criticizing Berman's "rather small-minded lament"); D. KELLEY, HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at xi. Kelley would doubtless have even less patience with A. BLOOM, THE CLOS-
ING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1988). 
20. Pp. 279-83. Kelley's views on tradition bear a strong resemblance to those of Alasdair 
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the true, universally applicable cultural science, Kelley offers the so-
bering example of Western legal science. It was the pretentious claim 
of early modem jurists that legal science is autonomous and universal 
that ultimately destroyed the law both as a subject and a science.21 
The same fate awaits any other pretender. 
Finally, Kelley challenges both the methods and the emphases of 
contemporary historiography. Many historians have shifted from in-
tellectual history toward social, economic, and institutional history. 
Kelley adopts an unabashedly intellectual and idealist genre and 
spurns what he calls "external history" (p. 5). Many historians have 
traced the origins of much of Western law, culture, science, and phi-
losophy to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.22 Kelley traces most 
of these origins to the ancient Greeks and Romans, and views the high 
middle ages more as a watershed than a wellspring in Western his-
tory.23 Many historians have emphasized the formative influence of 
religion and the church on Western culture, particularly legal cul-
ture.24 Kelley emphasizes "anthropocentric" and "secular" influences 
(pp. 8-9, 31-34, 279-83). He favors ius over fas, methodology over 
mythology, civil law over canon law. He stresses the secular, not the 
religious character of Greek, Roman, and Germanic law and culture; 
Macintyre. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); A. 
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JusncE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). 
21. Pp. 257-75, 278-79. See further discussion in A. BRECHT, PoLmCAL THEORY: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF TwENTIETH-CENTURY PoLmCAL THOUGHT 1651f. (1959); H. 
DOOYEWEERD, A CHRISTIAN THEORY OF SOCIAL INsnTUTIONS 31-58 (J. Witte ed., M. Ver-
brugge trans. 1986); H. DOOYEWEERD, IN THE Tw!LIGHT OF WESTERN THOUGHT 1-60 (1980). 
22. Among numerous others, see H. BERMAN, supra note 3; H. BUTIBRFIELD, THE ORIGINS 
OF MODERN SCIENCE: 1300-1800 (rev. ed. 1957); M. CHENY, NATURE, MAN & SOCIETY IN 
THE TwELFTH CENTURY (J. Laylor & L. Little eds. and trans. 1959); c. HASKINS, THE REN-
AISSANCE OF THE TwELFTH CENTURY (1957); P. KRISTELLER, MEDIEVAL AsPECI'S OP REN-
AISSANCE LEARNING 95-114 (1974) (chapter on contributions of religious orders); RENAISSANCE 
AND RENEWAL IN THE TwELFTH CENTURY (R. Benson & G. Constable eds. 1982); G. TBL-
LENBACH, LIBERTAS: K!RCHE UND WELTORDNUNG IM ZEITALTER DES INVESTITURSTREITES 
(1936); B. TIERNEY, supra note 3. 
23. Kelley writes that "[t]he modem legal tradition was born, or reborn, in the general cul-
tural revival of the twelfth century,'' but much of his discussion concerns "rebirth" rather than 
new birth. P. 109. 
24. For an introduction to this literature, see, among numerous others, E. BRUNNER, CHRIS· 
TIANITY AND C!vILIZATION (1948-49); C. DAWSON, THE HISTORICAL REALITY OP CHRISTIAN 
CuLTURE (1960); C. DAWSON, RELIGION AND CuLTURE (1948); C. DAWSON, RELIGION AND 
THE RlsE OF WESTERN CuLTURE (1950); H. DOOYEWEERD, ROOTS OF WESTERN CuLTURE: 
PAGAN, SECULAR AND CHRISTIAN OPTIONS (J. Kraay trans., M. Vander Vennan & B. Zylstra 
eds. 1979); G. FLOROVSKY, CHRISTIANITY AND CuLTURE (1974); H. NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND 
CuLTURE (1951); K. HOLL, THE CuLTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFORMATION (1959). For 
more specialized treatments of religion and legal culture, see, among numerous others, H. 
BERMAN, supra note 3; H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); K. 
BONGER & H. TRIMBORN, RELIGil:iSE BINDUNGEN IN FR0HEN UNO ORIBNTALISCHEN 
RECHTEN (1952); CHRISTENTUM, SAKULARISATION UND MODERNES RECHT (L. Vallauri & G. 
Dilcher eds. 1981); H. DOMBOIS, DES RECHT DER GRADE (1961-1983); H. DOOYEWEERD, EN-
CYCLOPAEDIE, supra note 3; z. FALK, LAW AND RELIGION: THE JEWISH ExPERIBNCE (1981); 
NUOVI MOTi PER LA FORMAZIONE DEL DIRITIO (1988) (proceedings of a European conference 
on H. BERMAN'S LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 3). 
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the pagan Romanist, not the Catholic canonist influences in the mid-
dle ages; the Renaissance humanist, not the reformed Protestant con-
tributions to early modem times. "Man is the measure of all things,'' 
the Greek philosopher Protagoras pronounced, and Kelley takes this 
secular lesson to heart both in entitling his book and in executing it. 25 
II. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
Although impressive in erudition and imaginative in argument, 
Professor Kelley's book is not immune from criticism. Notwithstand-
ing its dustjacket raves, the book has severaI problems that, at least to 
my mind, detract appreciably from its quality and value. 
First, the book bears some evidence of scissors and paste. Kelley 
has not been entirely successful in weavmg some of his earlier pub-
lished essays into a coherent volume. The opening chapters, which are 
largely new, appear at times to be hastily constructed and heavily de-
pendent on selected secondary sources. This is particularly true of the 
chapters on Hellenic Greece and Republican Rome.26 But Kelley's 
main thesis about W estem law and culture is clearly argued in these 
opening chapters. The later chapters, which were published in part 
before, are clear, concise, and carefully culled from the primary 
sources. The chapters on Italian and French jurisprudence in particu-
lar are simply brilliant. But Kelley's main argument appears only in-
termittently in these later chapters, at times almost as an afterthought. 
The writing of a synthetic summary of the volume would perhaps have 
25. THE OLDER SOPHISTS: A CoMPLETE TRANSLATION 80 (R. Sprague ed. 1972). See text 
accompanying infra note 47 on Kelley's "secular historiography." 
26. In these two chapters, Kelley does not deal with several pertinent sources, particularly 
legal sources, that both confirm and challenge his interpretation. The chapter on the Greeks 
would have benefited considerably from closer attention to R. BONNER & G. SMITH, THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JusncE FROM HOMER TO ARlsTOTLE (1930); G. CALHOUN, THE GROWTH 
OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ANCIENT GREECE (1927); E. CoHEN, ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARITIME 
CoURTS (1973); R. STROUD, DRAKON'S LAW ON HOMICIDE (University of California Publica-
tions: Classical Studies Vol. 5, 1968), as well as the numerous primary sources discussed therein. 
The chapter on republican Rome, although conversant with the classic European literature, pays 
only scant attention to the rich corpus of writings by the eminent Romanist Alan Watson, whose 
interpretations of the Roman texts and their cultural effect are radically different from those of 
Kelley. See, e.g., A. WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1974); A. 
WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965); A. WATSON, 
THE LAW OF PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1967); A. WATSON, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1968); A. WATSON, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN 
THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1971); A. WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW (1987); A. WATSON, 
ROME OF THE TwELVE TABLES: PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1975). Kelley's discussion both of 
Roman law itself, and of its significance in the Western legal tradition, would also have been 
aided by closer consideration ofD. DAUBE, FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION (1956); D. DAUBE, 
ROMAN LAW: LINGUISTIC, SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL AsPECTS (1969); J. DECLAREUIL, 
ROME THE LAW-GIVER (1926); H. JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 
(1957). Only a pedant would insist that Kelley cite and discuss every source that bears on a topic 
as vast as he has tackled. But Kelley has ignored too many standard works that challenge or 
contradict his discussion. 
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given him the distance he needed to prune his data and integrate his 
discussion more fully. 
Second, the book contains too few definitions of terms and princi-
ples of selection. Kelley spends a page defining nomos but then admits 
that his definition is "a large and metahistorical idealization" (pp. 8-
9). Other key terms, such as "society," "culture," "legal science," 
"legal philosophy," the "Western legal tradition," and many others 
that he uses repeatedly and variously throughout the book are left 
largely undefined. Without such definitions, the reader is given little 
insight into what has guided Professor Kelley's selection of writers 
and movements. He describes his book as "an exploration of the legal 
canon as it unfolded and was interpreted and transformed" in the 
West (p. 5). But why focus so carefully on Greek mythology and ig-
nore Western Jewish jurisprudence, which was equally, if not more, 
influential?27 Why study the Lombard and Salle laws, and only men-
tion in passing the Burgundian, Visigothic, Celtic, and Saxon codes? 
Why devote fifteen pages to the canonists and more than fifty to the 
civilians? Why recite the history of French and English law and 
barely touch on developments in Germany, Spain, or Italy? Why 
spend ten pages on Vico and only a paragraph on Blackstone? Why 
dwell at length on the law of nations and barely touch the laws of 
delict, crime, and inheritance, among others? Selectivity is, of course, 
essential to the success of a sweeping summary such as this. But with 
little sense of Kelley's principles of selection, the reader is left to won-
der at his apparent omissions and peculiar emphases. 
In some instances, Kelley seems simply to be playing to his strong 
expertise on early modem French and Italian legal literature. When 
discussing the influence of the Reformation on Western law and cul-
ture, for example, he briefly mentions Luther and Calvin, and then 
discourses at length on his old favorites Frangois Hotman and Charles 
Dumoulin.28 Whatever the influence of Hotman and Dumoulin may 
have been in France, Luther and Calvin clearly had a more enduring 
and embracive influence on the Western legal tradition.29 When dis-
cussing Germanic laws, he emphasizes the Salle and Lombard laws -
subjects intimately familiar to the French and Italian humanists of the 
Renaissance, and thus to Kelley. Recent scholarship, however, has 
demonstrated that other Germanic codes were more critical to the de-
27. See, e.g., E. DORFF & A. RosETI, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OP 
JEWISH LAW (1988); A. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING: A STUDY 
THROUGH TIME (1979). 
28. Pp. 161-64, 187-88, 201-09. See similar discussion of these writers in D. KELLEY, FOUN· 
DATIONS, supra note 1, at 151-82; D. KELLEY, FRAN<;:OIS HOTMAN, supra note I, passim. 
29. See generally J. BOHATEC, CALVINS LEHRE VON STAAT UNO KIRCHE (1937); J. TON-
KIN, THE CHURCH AND THE SECULAR ORDER IN REFORMATION THOUGHT (1971); Berman & 
Witte, The Transformation of Western Legal Philosophy in Lutheran Germany, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1573 (1989). 
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velopment of the W estem legal tradition. 30 But, beyond such hints, 
the reader is left to guess at Kelley's principles of selection. 
Third, the book contains many questionable assertions of fact. 
Kelley states, for example, that the Greeks and Romans developed 
doctrines of subjective rights and individual liberties (p. 50). But such 
doctrines were first developed by the canonists of the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries and the nominalists of the fourteenth.31 Kelley as-
serts repeatedly that the "juridical trinity" of persons, things, and 
actions set forth in Gaius' Institutes was the organizing principle of 
Roman law, with which the Romans were "obsessed" (pp. 48-52, 61-
64). But even Gaius himself abandoned this trichotomy, and the au-
thors of the meandering Theodosian Code and Digest certainly paid it 
little heed. 32 Kelley argues that the Christian "principle of Trinity ... 
merited a special title in the collections of civil law since Theodosius" 
(pp. 155, 78), and its inclusion in the law "symbolize[d] the new ideo-
logical unity (if not uniformity) of Roman civilization" (p. 63). But 
the Trinity does not appear as a title in any books of the Theodosian 
Code or the Corpus Iuris Civilis - except the Codex Iustinianus of 
534 A.D. - and, although the doctrine was amply discussed in some 
theological circles, it did not have nearly the central and centralizing 
significance for law that Kelley describes. 33 Kelley asserts that Pope 
30. See, e.g .• G. Kl:>BLER, DAS RECHT IM FROHEN MrITELALTER: UNTERSUCHUNGEN zu 
HERKUNFf UNO INHALT FR0HMITTELALTERLICHER RECHTSBEGRIFFE IM DEUTSCHEN 
SPRACHGEBEITE (1971); K. KRoESCHELL, HAus UNO HERRSCHAFf IM FROHEN DEUTSCHEN 
RECHT (1968); Berman, Individualistic and Communitarian Theories of Justice.· An Historical 
Approach, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 549, 557-66 (1988); Reynolds, Law and Communities in West-
ern Christendom, c. 900-1140, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 205 (1981). 
31. See Coing, Zur Geschichte des Begriffs subjektives Recht, in 1 H. CoING, G.A. supra note 
3, at 245; Heymann, Zur Geschichte des jus ad rem, in FESTGABE 0. GIERKE 1167 (1911); 
Tierney, Villey, Ockham, and the Origin of Individual Rights, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF 
THE LAW: EssAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION 1 (J. Witte, Jr. & F. Alexander eds. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW]; Villey, La Genese du droit subjectif chez Guil-
laume d'Occam, 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 97 (1964). 
32. Although in 1.8 of his Institutes ("On the division of the law"}, Gaius writes, "All our 
law is about persons, things or actions," he divides his analysis into four commentaries, which 
treat (1) types and divisions oflaws, and then persons; (2) things; (3) testate and intestate suc-
cession; and (4) actions. Not only does the commentary on "succession" depart from his 
schema, but Gaius also smuggles a good deal of his discussion of persons into the commentary on 
actions. See THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS (W. Gordon & 0. Robinson trans. 1988). The Codex 
Theodosianus and Digest, which were the two most famous collections of classical Roman law 
known to the West, are divided into 16 and 50 books respectively and manifest little allegiance to 
Gaius' trichotomy. See THE THEODOSIAN CoDE AND NOVELS AND THE SIRMONDIAN CONSTI-
TUTIONS (C. Pharr ed. 1952) [hereinafter THE THEODOSIAN CODE]; THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 
(T. Mommsen & P. Krueger eds., A. Watson trans. 1985); cf. H. GOUDY, TRICHOTOMY IN 
ROMAN LAW (1910) (stressing the symbolic and heuristic importance of the number 3 at Roman 
law). Goudy shows, however, that Gaius was not the source, but merely an example of this 
trichotomy. He shows further, in this and other works, that the numbers 2, 4, 7, and 12 also had 
important symbolic and heuristic value for the Roman jurists, among other ancient cultures. Id. 
at 2-7, 73-77. 
33. See The Code of Our Lord the Most Sacred Emperor Justinian, Bk. I, Title I, in 12 THE 
CIVIL LAW 9 (S. Scott ed. 1932). The Theodosian Code does touch on the Christian doctrine of 
Trinity sporadically in Book 16, Title 1 (On the Catholic Faith}, Title 2 (On Bishops, Churches, 
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Gelasius I developed the biblical principle of the two swords (pp. 119, 
151). But Gelasius referred, without biblical citation, to "two pow-
ers," which he divided into priestly authority (auctoritas) and royal 
power (potestas). 34 The biblical principle of "two swords" was fully 
developed only in the course of the Papal Revolution and then with 
considerably different political implications from those Kelley de-
scribes. 35 Kelley argues that the medieval canonists' emphasis on the 
"free will" of the "person," was of "immense significance" for the de-
velopment of doctrines of marriage, crime, and contract (p. 153). But 
the critical impetus for the development of these doctrines came from 
sacramental theology, not canonist casuistry, and in these writings the 
themes of "free will" played only a minor part.36 Kelley asserts that 
the English writs were "more or less equivalent to the ancient Roman 
legal actions" (p. 166). But except for a few superficial analogies, the 
Roman actions and English writs had little in common. 37 Kelley as-
serts that until Fortescue and St. Germain, "English common law ... 
lacked ... a full-fledged jurisprudence, a philosophy of law compara-
ble to that formulated by Ulpian and his classical colleagues" (p. 169). 
But the classical Roman jurists developed only the most rudimentary 
legal philosophy, and it was certainly no more "full-fledged" than that 
of Bracton and other medieval common lawyers. Dozens of such 
questionable assertions throughout the volume mar Kelley's analysis. 
In a sweeping synthesis such as this, there are, of course, bound to 
be several such errors that can be easily corrected in subsequent print-
and Clerics), and Title 5 (On Heretics). See THE THEODOSIAN CoDE, supra note 32, at 440-76. 
Discussion of the doctrine of Trinity also appears periodically in the Justinian's Novellae but, 
again, not as a separate title and not with the prominence that Kelley describes. See further 
discussion of the "Gaian" and "Christian Trinity," infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
34. See copy of the letter in PUBLIZISTISCHE SAMMLUNGEN ZUM AcACIANISCHEN SCHISMA 
20-21 (E. Schwartz ed. 1934), with English translation in B. TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OP CHURCH 
& STATE 1050-1300, at 13-15 (1964). 
35. See B. TIERNEY, supra note 34, at 8; see also Hoffmann, Die beiden Schwerter im hiihen 
Mittelalter, 20 D.A. 78 (1965); cf. G. CASPARY, PoLmcs AND EXEGESIS: ORIGEN AND THE 
Two SWORDS (1979) (tracing antecedents of the high medieval doctrine to patristic interpreta-
tions of Luke 22:38, but not suggesting an earlier political two swords doctrine). 
36. See J. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHR!SfIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); 
Witte, The Reformation of Marriage Law in Martin Luther's Germany: Its Significance Then and 
Now, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 293, 298-307 (1986) and the numerous sources cited and discussed 
therein. 
37. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OP ACTION AT COMMON LAW 73-74 (A. Chaytor 
& W. Whittaker eds. 1936); Watson, The Fifth Annual Brandon Brown Lecture - Roman Law 
and English Law: Two Patterns of Legal Development, 36 LoYOLA L. REV. 247, 253-63 (1990). 
In the same passage, Kelley says that "the Qu[o] warranto proceedings beginning in the thir-
teenth (and appearing again in the sixteenth) century" illustrate how "written documentation 
and procedures were fixed and easily subject to political control, 'strict interpretation,' and the 
subversion of customary arrangements." P. 166. The quo warranto writs did not depend on 
"subversion" of custom, however, but rather the punctilious insistence on customary 
"franchise." Moreover, the quo warranto writs of the thirteenth century differed considerably in 
form and function from those of the sixteenth. See generally D. SUTHERLAND, Quo W ARRANTO 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF EDWARD I 1278-1294 (1963) (explaining the history of quo 
warranto writs). 
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ings. But some of these errors are symptomatic of a fourth problem 
with the book, namely, Kelley's questionable interpretation of the 
Western legal tradition. Kelley does not intend or pretend to rewrite 
the history of the Western legal tradition. He is interested in this tra-
dition not so much as a subject in its own right but as a fertile source 
of W estem cultural ideas, which most intellectual historians have 
overlooked. Two curious tendencies in his approach, however, lead 
him to distort some of the legal data in arguing for his thesis. 
On the one hand, Kelley adopts too static and modem a view of 
legal terms. He uses technical legal terms like contract, property, 
marriage, inheritance, succession, rights, liberties, procedure, office, 
corporation, and numerous others with little evident sensitivity to 
their dramatic semantic and substantive shifts over time and across 
legal systems. 38 He uses pregnant political terms such as public and 
private, person and association, welfare and responsibility in a manner 
that would perhaps satisfy Leibniz or Locke, but would confuse Gra-
tian or Gaius. 39 Many of these terms change their colors and contents 
radically as one moves from Greek to Roman to Germanic law, from 
canon to civil to common law.40 Although Kelley masterfully parses 
the etymology and evolution of many philosophical and theological 
terms in this text, he does not give the same attention to legal and 
political terms. 
On the other hand, Kelley adopts too abstract and ahistorical a 
view of the W estem legal tradition. He focuses on legal ideas, not 
legal institutions. He studies jurisprudential summaries, not judicial 
38. Kelley's static use of legal terms does not seem to be entirely accidental, for he writes that 
"the language of the law has been preserved - through intellectual habits, professional conven-
tions, technical terms, proverbs, maxims, and the like - across many centuries and has ostensi-
bly permitted an endless and fairly continuous dialogue which has formed the canon and shaped 
the scholastic character of western jurisprudence." Pp. xii-xiii. 
39. On early interpretations of these distinctions, see, for example, H. MOLLEJANS, PUB-
LICUS UND PRIVATUS IM ROMISCHEN RECHT UND IM ALTEREN KANONISCHEN RECHT (1961). 
On later interpretations, see H. DIESSELHORST, PRIVATUS EN PUBLICUS VAN GRATIAN TOT 
GROTIUS (1914). 
40. An enormous body of legal scholarship has been devoted to the evolution of various legal 
terms. On the evolution of "contract" and "obligation," for example, see G. DI6SDI, CONTRACT 
IN ROMAN LAW FROM THE TwELVE TABLES TO THE GLOSSATORS (1981); P. NANZ, DIE 
ENTSTEHUNG DES Al.LGEMEINEN VERTRAGSBEGRIFFS IM 16. BIS, 18 JAHRHUNDERT (1985); L. 
SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAGE DOGMENGESCHICHTLICHE 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN (1881); TOWARD A GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT (J. Barton ed. 1990); 
Berman, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L. & 
RELIGION 103 (1986); Feenstra, Pact and Contract in the Law Countries from the 16th to the 18th 
Century, in TOWARDS A GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT 197 (1990). On the evolution of"corpo-
ration" and "association," see B. TIERNEY, supra note 3, at 19-42; 0. VON GIERKE, DAS 
DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1887). On the various meanings of "crime" and "fault," 
see H. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 52-60, 68-84, 181-98; w. ENGELMANN, DIE SCHULDLEHRE 
DER PosrGLOSSATOREN UND IHRE FORTENTWICKLUNG (1965); s. KUTTNER, KANONISTICHE 
SCHULDLEHRE VON GRATIAN BIS AUF DIE DEKRETALEN GREGORS IX (1935); Durham, Reli-
gion and the Criminal Law: Types and Contexts of Interaction, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF 
THE LAW, supra note 31, at 193. 
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and legislative records.41 He emphasizes the intellectual sources of the 
law, not its social, political, and economic conditions. By abstracting 
legal ideas and terms from their institutional and cultural contexts, 
Kelley is able "to view this tradition apart from particular historical 
movements and environments" and to wander freely "over many cen-
turies and across national boundaries" to support his thesis (p. 6). 
Although such a methodology produces provocative insights into 
the Western legal tradition, it also produces many problematic inter-
pretations of it. Two such problems merit particular emphasis. 
Kelley's method of interpretation allows him to associate and anal-
ogize ideas far too freely. For example, he draws several curious con-
nections between the "juridical trinity" of persons, things, and actions 
in Roman law and the "Holy Trinity" of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost 
in Christian theology. Kelley writes that the Christian "myth" of the 
Trinity was "imperfectly converted" from pagan Roman legal ante-
cedents and "formulated authoritatively in the first ecumenical council 
of Nicaea in 325 under the auspices of the emperor" (pp. 118-19). But 
the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was formulated by the Church Fa-
thers long before Nicaea, and their formulations were certainly in-
spired more by Christian traditions and canons than by Roman law 
and leaming.42 Kelley argues that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity 
organized patristic and medieval Christian theology, much in the same 
way that the Gaian Trinity organized Roman and Romanist law (pp. 
61-78, 109-26). But even a cursory comparison of standard legal texts 
like Justinian's Digest or Accursius' Glossa Ordinaria and standard 
theological texts like Augustine's City of God or Lombard's Book of 
Sentences indicates that these two "trinities" were neither organizing 
nor analogous. Kelley states that the two trinities were "fateful[ly] 
interpenetrat[ed]" in Roman legal texts, symbolizing and catalyzing 
"the new ideological unity (if not uniformity) of Roman civilization" 
(p. 63). But references to the Christian Trinity appear only sporadi-
cally in the Roman legal texts. Moreover, the Christian doctrine of 
Trinity spawned enormous discord and division within the Church of 
the first millennium, splitting the Greek and Latin Fathers, and ulti-
mately the Orthodox and Catholic branches of the Church. Had Kel-
ley placed these trinitarian ideas in their institutional and cultural 
41. This focus is deliberate. See, e.g., p. 5 (he will not "chronicle Western legal thought in a 
professional or a disciplinary way," or dwell on "the 'external [that is, institutional] history' of 
the law [or] the 'original' meaning of legal texts"). 
42. See, e.g., T. DE REGNON, ETUDES DE THEOLOGJE PosmvE SUR LA SAINTE TRINrrE 
(1892-98); E. FORTMAN, THE TRIUNE GOD (1972); J. PELIKAN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
CATHOLIC TRAomoN (100-600), at 172-225 (1971); 1-2 G. PRESTIGE, Goo IN PATRISTIC 
THOUGHT (1959). An important antecedent to the Nicene formulation of this doctrine of Trinity 
was that of the Apostles' Creed (c. 200 A.D.). See J. KELLY, THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CREEDS 
1-6 (1950); 1 P. SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM WITH A HISTORY AND CRmCAL 
NOTES 14-29 {1877). 
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contexts, he would perhaps not have drawn associations and analogies 
between them so freely. 
Kelley's method of interpretation also leads him to exaggerate the 
antiquity and continuity of the W estem legal tradition. In effect, he 
treats this tradition as a seamless and timeless web. According to his 
interpretation, most of the basic terms, methods, and doctrines of law 
were set forth by the ancient Greeks and Romans. Instances of such 
terms, methods, and doctrines in later texts are treated as indications 
of ongoing Greek and Roman influence. Thus, for example, Kelley 
attributes the "scientific" and "intellectual revolution" of Roman law 
in the late republic to the infusion of "Platonic ideals, Aristotelian 
categories, sophistic topoi, and dialectical method."43 He describes 
the twelfth-century "revival of legal science" as a "recapitulation" of 
"the pre-Ciceronian 'scientific revolution'" (pp. 109-18). He argues 
that the writings of such diverse figures as Bracton, Bartolus, Calvin, 
Grotius, and Hegel maintained allegiance to basic Roman legal lan-
guage and lore and that many early modem societies experienced 
ongoing "receptions of Roman law" (pp. 122-23, 128ff., 162, 167ff., 
213ff., 252ff.). This interpretation may be accurate as far it goes, but it 
is rather misleading. The scientific revolution of law in republican 
Rome was catalyzed more by Rome's desire to control its wayward 
provinces and to accommodate new social and economic patterns than 
by its new appetite for Greek philosophy.44 The twelfth-century 
revolution of legal science was not so much a recapitulation of the 
Roman revolution as the product of the new struggles between church 
and state, canon law and civil law, Christian theology and ancient 
learning. 45 European jurists and philosophers from Bracton to Hegel 
looked for inspiration and instruction in many other sources before 
they turned to the texts of Roman law. The "receptions'' of Roman 
law were not the "full-fledged ... Romanization[s] of law" (p. 122) 
and importations of classic Roman law and learning that Kelley de-
scribes. They were attempts by legal professionals and pedagogues 
from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries to integrate and organ-
ize the laws of their polities and curricula. Such laws, to be sure, in-
cluded classic Roman and Romanist law, but also Catholic and 
Protestant canon law, feudal law, manorial law, mercantile law, and 
other sources that comprised the jus commune of W estem Europe. 46 
The genius of the Western legal tradition is not only its continuity 
and antiquity. It is also its creativity and adaptability to the many 
43. Pp. 4445. He prefaces this remark by saying "the channels of transmission are obscure" 
and cites several secondary sources who make this same admission. P. 44. 
44. See sources cited supra note 26. 
45. See sources cited supra note 22. 
46. See generally w. TRUSEN, ANFANGE DES GELEHRTEN REcHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND 
(1962); F. WIEACKER, supra note 3, at 124-248. 
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transformations and revolutions that have occurred in the history of 
Western culture. Western law has been constantly recast into new en-
sembles, with new terms, new doctrines, new methods, and new em-
phases that sometimes supplement, sometimes supplant traditional 
ones. Had Professor Kelley viewed the Western legal tradition more 
as a patchwork quilt than as a seamless web, he would perhaps have 
emphasized both the continuity and the discontinuity, both the antiq-
uity and the novelty of Western law. 
Finally, Kelley's stridently "anthropocentric" perspective distorts 
his descriptions of the past and dilutes his prescriptions for the future. 
Kelley describes The Human Measure as an "atonement" for his ear-
lier works which had "undervalued" the role of myth and religion in 
the West (p. x). This book is not an adequate atonement. Kelley dis-
cusses religion, but ascribes to it a largely prefatory and perfunctory 
role in the development of Western law and culture. The early Del-
phic and Olympic religions of Greece are treated as "primitive" and 
"protolegal" and given little part to play after the "legal revolutions" 
of Draco and Solon. The "peculiar cosmology" of the Romans is de-
scribed as a "rudimentary jurisprudence" that fell into desuetude after 
the "codification" of the Twelve Tables. The Christian religion, while 
more institutionally formative in the middle ages, is said to have made 
only marginal contributions thereafter. The historiography of the past 
three decades, however, has confirmed the once universally accepted 
view that religious ideas and institutions - in Olympic, Judaic, Ger-
manic, and Christian forms - have had a remarkably enduring and 
embracive influence on the Western legal tradition.47 
Kelley's concluding prescription is equally anthropocentric. The 
"moral" to his story is that "self-knowledge in the social and cultural 
spheres does not come easily" but it is coming (p. 282). True self-
knowledge will be finally achieved when the West undertakes a "Co-
pernican Counter-Revolution, in which the 'person' is indeed, in terms 
of experience, at the center of the universe."48 This primitive individ-
ualistic teleology, however, belies the traditional Western belief that 
every person is inextricably part of a communion of saints, a commu-
nity of associations, and a commonwealth of nations. 
47. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
48. Pp. 292-93. A few paragraphs later Kelley writes that "man's central position in the 
world has been undermined by various intellectual revolutions." P. 283. 
